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ABSTRACT1 
 
The prevalent form of business organizations in Korea is a chaebol. The chaebol is a diversified conglomerate. This 
paper addresses the following issues concerning Korean chaebols:  1) reasons for diversification, 2) advantages and 
shortcomings of chaebols, 3) issues facing Korean chaebols, and 4) chaebols’ managing the crisis and making 
reforms. We found that Korean chaebols managed to learn from the economic crisis and made successful reforms. 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
ost large Korean firms are diversified conglomerates (Jung and Yang, 1992). The four largest of 
which are Samsung, LG, Hyundai Motor and SK based on sales in 2004. Samsung is the largest in 
sales; 63 companies make up the Samsung group. LG consists of 46 companies; Hyundai Motor has 
28, and 59 companies make up the SK group. Diversified conglomerates dubbed chaebol in Korea, are the prevalent 
form of business organizations. As Khanna and Rivkin (2001) point out, such business groups are more common in 
emerging economies than in advanced economies. 
 
Studies on firms’ product portfolios focus on the why, where and what of diversification. The why of diversification 
is to discover determinants of product diversification. Teece (1980, 1982) has summarized that transaction costs, 
excess resources and scope economies account for product diversification. Studies on the where of diversification 
focus on the direction of firms’ product diversification. Numerous studies report that related diversification contributes 
to firms’ profits more than unrelated product diversification (Barney, 1988; Caves, 1971; Gorecki, 1975; Rumelt; 
1982: Teece et al., 1994). What are the impacts of diversification? Remelt’s study (1982) shows that “the highest 
levels of profitability were exhibited by those having a strategy of diversifying primarily into those areas that drew on 
some common core skill or resource” (p.359). Montgomery and Wenerfelt (1988) drew a similar conclusion that the 
farther firms must go to use their factors, the lower the marginal rents they extract. Teece et al. (1994) also found that 
given tight selection environments, coherent diversification is the most common corporate diversification mode in the 
U.S. economy as well as in other countries, especially in Korea. 
 
This paper will explore the reasons why Korean chaebols are diversifying; study advantages and shortcomings of 
Korean chaebols; and assess chaebols’ dynamic capabilities of managing the economic crisis and making reforms. 
The forms of organization clearly matter in firms’ performance (Brickley et al., 2007; Milgrom & Roberts, 1992).  
Thus assessing advantages and shortcomings will offer clues to improve Korean chaebols. Survey data in our earlier 
study (Park & Shin, 2004) provides the starting point for this analysis. 
 
The paper consists of five sections.  Section 2 briefly surveys the literature; section 3 provides the design of the survey 
and reports the survey results.  We discuss the results in section 4 and present conclusions and implications in section 
5.  
 
  
																																								 																				
1 This manuscript was original published in the International Business & Economics Research Journal 7(1), 57-66. Due to high download rates 
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2. LITERATURE 
 
Excess capacity of production factors is regarded as the most important determinant of firms’ product diversification 
(Caves, 1971; Gorecki, 1975; Penrose, 1959; Teece, 1982). According to the excess capacity of resources, firms 
diversify in response to excess capacity of resources that are subject to market failure (Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 
1988). The firm may decide to use the capacity internally, instead of selling or renting it in an imperfect factor market, 
and these circumstances lead to diversification (Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1988; Williamson, 1985). 
 
Transaction cost theory (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975, 1985) offers an answer to the question of why not all 
production is carried on by one big firm. According to Coase (1937), “a firm will tend to expand until the costs of 
organizing an extra transaction within the firm equal the costs of carrying out the same transaction by means of an 
exchange on the open market or the costs of organizing in another firm.” Williamson (1975, 1985) indicated that 
volume, frequency, and asset specificity are determining factors of internal production or market. The frequent and 
large volume of production with a high degree of asset specificity leads to product diversification. 
 
Scope economies (Chandler, 1990; Teece, 1980, 1982) give an advantage of diversification in production costs over 
the market. Our study investigates other factors of firms’ product diversification that may be unique in Korean 
chaebols. Large Korean chaebols have the same proclivity of oligopoly. They tend to compete with each other. When 
one chaebol delves into a new business, other chaebols tend to rush into that business. 
 
Chaebols may need to diversify to avoid declining profits in one industry. Schmalensee (1985) and Rumelt (1991) 
indicate that industry effects are the main sources of firm profitability. Demand growth in mature industries tends to 
be stagnant, so Korean chaebols typically expand in new and high-tech growth industries and diversify rather than 
exit from mature industries. 
 
Since close family ties are the nature of Korean culture, owners of business firms try to give businesses to their 
children. These tendencies can also be a source of diversification in Korean chaebols. 
  
Benefits and shortcomings stem from the nature of Korean chaebols. Benefits can be scale and scope economies, vast 
knowledge and experiences in diversified businesses, reputation and brand name. Some characteristics of chaebols 
are disadvantages because they are diversified. 
 
Simon (1993) views the history of organizations in evolutionary terms.  He states that each organization competes 
with others for scarce resources, and organizations’ fates must consequently be decided by some combination of 
natural selection and rational adaptation. 
   
3. DESIGNS AND CONDUCT OF SURVEY 
 
Our study examines Korean chaebols’ learning from the Korean economic crisis. The survey questionnaire was 
designed to create a better understanding of the nature of Korean chaebols and their improvement. We created a 
website for the questionnaire and asked managers to answer questions. Two-hundred four managers, representing the 
majority of large business groups in Korea and many other firms, responded to the survey. The questionnaire was 
designed for respondents to rank the top three items in the order of importance among the listed factors in each 
question. To avoid confusion in priority ranking we did not ask respondents to rank all items in each question.  
 
3.1 Reasons for Diversification 
 
The first survey question, regarding reasons for diversification, has designed to find out why Korean chaebols 
diversify. Weighting was used to signify the importance of each factor.  Each factor’s weighted total score was 
calculated by giving more weight to rank 1 than rank 2; more weight to rank 2 than rank 3. For example, 36 respondents 
ranked chaebols’ competition with each other as the most important reason for chaebols’ diversification; 38 
respondents ranked it as the second most important reason; and 79 respondents ranked it as the third most important 
reason. The total score for chaebols’ diversification on competing with each other is 263, which is obtained as follows: 
36 X 3 + 38 X 2 + 79 X 1 = 263 
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The rank of each factor is determined by the total score and Table 1 is the results of the survey on reasons for chaebols’ 
diversification. 
 
Diversification combines multiple business cycles from each product market, so lowering risk that is, smoothing out 
performance fluctuations (Salter and Weinhold, 1979). Diversification reduces the probability that a firm will 
experience lower performance, so firms   make adaptive change to avoid performance fluctuations (Donaldson, 2000). 
The benefits of such financial portfolio diversification for individuals are well established and proved, diversifying 
the corporate product portfolio is not as well established. However survey results show that diversification to avoid 
risks has the highest survey responses. 
 
Table 1. Reasons for Diversification 
Factors Responses 1 2 3 Total Rank 
To avoid the risk of a single product business 88 61 34 420 1 
To participate in new businesses using new state of the art 
technologies 59 69 32 347 2 
To compete with other chaebols 36 38 79 263 3 
To leave business as inheritance to children 9 26 38 117 4 
Others 5 2 9 28 5 
 
Large chaebols such as Samsung, LG and SK all developed in new products using new technologies. For example, all 
three participated in telecommunication as it emerged. Samsung and LG are now second and third in market share of 
mobile phone sales. They also tend to show the oligopoly behavior of competition: if one large firm enters into a new 
field in business, others tend to follow the leader. 
 
3.2 Benefits of Chaebols 
 
The survey question on benefits of chaebols included six items. Table 2 shows the survey results of respondents.  
 
Table 2. Benefits of Chaebols 
Factors Responses 1 2 3 Total Rank 
Easy diversification in businesses with established reputation, and 
recognition of chaebols’ brand name 59 65 30 337 1 
Scope economies by synergy effects 71 36 40 325 2 
Scale economies by large size 33 35 37 206 3 
Improvements in decision making by having cumulated 
knowledge and experiences of many companies in a chaebol 15 35 35 150 4 
Improvements in capturing new business opportunities with vast 
knowledge in many fields of business 9 16 42 101 5 
Other 0 0 0 0 6 
 
Survey respondents ranked easy diversification due to chaebols’ brand name reputation and recognition on the top. 
According to Caves (1980), brand name is an intangible asset and brand name resource does not deplete as the firm 
uses it more. This result, therefore, supports the excess resource theory of diversification. 
 
Scores in scope and scale economies, 325 and 206 respectively, illustrate that diversified chaebols are well aware of 
the advantages of scope and scale economies. Chandler (1990) points out cost advantages due to U.S. business firms’ 
scope and scale economies. Teece’s (1982) paper on multiproducts of the firm shows the benefit of the scope economy 
of multiproducts. 
 
Improvements in decision making with cumulated knowledge and experiences of corporate leaders in the chaebols 
gathered a significant number of responses. Improvements in capturing new business opportunities also show some 
significance. These two factors are benefits of chaebols because the chaebol form of business conglomerates engages 
in businesses across several industries. Chaebol decision making groups also have a wealth of knowledge and 
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experience. The knowledge-based approach to the firm values highly the importance of knowledge and experiences 
(Barney, 1986; Grant, 1996; Knudsen, 1995; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, Spencer, 1996). 
 
3.3 Shortcomings of Chaebols 
 
The chaebol’s organizational form has hazards as well as benefits. The negative aspects of chaebols need to be 
examined carefully to mitigate such hazards. The survey question designed to find out shortcomings of chaebols is 
informative.  
 
Table 3. Shortcomings of Chaebols 
Factors Responses 1 2 3 Total Rank 
Lack of business transparency 30 51 22 214 1 
High risks of businesses due to the CEO’s autocratic decision-
making 37 29 40 209 2 
Increase in exit costs by losing timely exit of unprofitable 
businesses 29 36 24 183 3 
Increase in management costs due to the bureaucratic 
organization 36 23 27 181 4 
Inefficient resource allocation 24 13 34 132 5 
Lack of the timely decision making and adaptation 23 22 17 130 6 
Delay of development in core capabilities 10 13 20 76 7 
Other 0 0 1 1 8 
 
As the survey indicates, one of the pressing problems in chaebols is the lack of business transparency. The information 
asymmetry problems are ubiquitous in today’s business world. However, the unique problem stemming from 
asymmetric information in chaebols is the governance problem, since the top managers or CEOs in chaebols tend to 
be both owners and managers. They are different from the hired managers with a small stake in the company. Managers 
with relatively large ownership stake in diversified Korean chaebols often engage in expropriating the dispersed 
minority shareholders; the lack of transparency magnifies this expropriation. 
 
The highly autocratic decision-making in chaebols is dubbed as ‘imperialistic management’ in the popular Korean 
press. This kind of management has adverse effects on corporate performance since managers do not fully utilize the 
knowledge and experiences of employees. However, the flip side of imperialistic management is that it may result in 
strong commitment to their favorite projects. It is a well-known fact that successes in Korean chaebols’ 
telecommunication businesses are generated by CEOs’ commitment of huge financial capital to research and 
development in semiconductor and telecommunication products. 
 
Chaebols’ cross-subsidies often serve to prolong the lives of unprofitable businesses and delay their exits. These 
practices can be burdensome to the whole chaebol group. The costs caused by delayed exits led to collapses of several 
chaebols during the 1997 Korean economic crisis such as Dawwoo and Ssangyong. 
 
Large organizations tend to be more bureaucratic and management costs rise as a result; significant numbers of 
respondents shared these concerns. Politics also play a role in large bureaucratic organization, and political decision 
making can result in inefficient resource allocation when bureaucratic organization loses timely decision making and 
adaptation to changing environments. These are shortcomings of the Korean chaebols. 
 
3.4 Issues Facing Korean Chaebols 
 
Korean chaebols confronted many issues during and after the 1997 economic crisis. Understanding the nature of the 
issues is helpful in addressing them. A fourth survey question was designed to discover the issues facing Korean 
chaebols. 
 
The five important issues facing Korean chaebols (improving management, establishing business transparency, 
innovations in chaebols organization, new technology development, and reducing conflicts and establishing 
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cooperation between labor and management) are related to the shortcomings of chaebols in Table 3.  Perhaps the most 
pressing issue from the owners’ perspectives today is the transition of ownership from parents to children. As owners 
of chaebols age and try to find ways to transfer ownership and management to children, these efforts waste 
entrepreneurs’ talents and are not productive (Baumol, 1990; Murphy et al., 1991). Policy makers and Korean society 
need to find ways to reduce these wastes.  Expert managers also accompany hazards.  Hired managers with small 
ownership stakes generate large agency costs as seen in the U.S. corporations. 
 
Table 4. Issues facing Korean Chaebols 
Factors Responses 1 2 3 Total Rank 
Improving management 47 42 24 249 1 
Establishing transparency 25 16 21 128 2 
Innovating in chaebol organization 12 26 38 126 3 
Developing new technology 15 24 19 112 4 
Reducing conflicts and establishing cooperation between labor 
and management 24 9 15 105 5 
Maintaining international competitiveness in products 18 8 10 80 6 
Addressing lack of demand for products 19 14 9 94 7 
Coordinating growth and income distribution 12 18 14 86 8 
Finding skilled labor 6 17 15 67 9 
Dealing with excessive government intervention 8 8 7 47 10 
Managing problems associated with economic growth and 
environmental pollutions 2 3 6 18 11 
Other 1 1 4 9 12 
 
Because corporate entrepreneurs play a key role in corporate innovation and firm growth, a nation’s economic growth 
depends heavily on the firm growth. As noted by Baumol (1968, 1990) and Murphy et al. (1991), the productive 
contribution of a society’s entrepreneurial activities vary depending on the relative payoffs on the types of 
entrepreneurial activities. To foster economic growth, society and policy makers should therefore provide an 
environment for productive entrepreneurial activities. Murphy et al. (1991) found that in most countries, rent seeking 
rewards talent more than entrepreneurship does, leading to stagnation.  Therefore, a reduction in inheritance tax should 
be given careful attention to lower the transition costs.  Public policy makers and society also need to find ways to 
channel the inheritance taxes to investment in R & D to improve the chaebols’ global competitiveness.    
 
4.   DISCUSSIONS 
 
4.1  Chaebols’ Diversification and Its Problems 
 
Clearly, forms of organization matter in performances of the firm (Brickley, Smith and Zimmerman, 2007; Milgrom 
and Roberts, 1992). Chaebols offer some significant advantages. Teece (1982) pointed out that transaction costs, 
excess resources and scope economies are sources of the firm’s product diversification. Here we have examined other 
sources of the firm’s product portfolio diversification. Of course business performances vary depending on the 
business cycle and product life cycle. Salter and Weinhold (1979) point out that diversification combines multiple 
business cycles from each product market, thus lowering risk, that is, smoothing out performance fluctuations. Some 
products may be procyclical and others may be counter cyclical. If a firm produces a single product, the performance 
of the firm will change drastically based on the phases of the business cycle. Firms may be able to avoid drastic 
changes in performance by mixing various products in their product portfolio.  Our survey results show that 
diversification to avoid the risk of a single product obtained the largest number of responses. 
 
Furthermore, profits or performances of the firm may decline when the firm’s product reaches its maturity or decline 
stage of the product life cycle. To prevent such declining profits, firms diversify their products in newly emerging 
products to capture profits of the emerging growth industry, using newly emerging state of the art technology. Scholars 
in corporate strategy and industrial organization also have studied industry effects, corporate (business group) effects 
and business unit (firm) effects (Chang and Singh, 2000; Chang and Hong 2002; Rumelt, 1991; Schmalensee, 1985) 
and found that industry effects are strong. Schmalensee (1985) argued that industry structures such as the number of 
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firms, market share, and entry barriers in industries can affect firm performances. It is more likely that the degree of 
competition gets keener as the product life cycle reaches maturity or decline, increasing the probability of low profits 
of the firm. 
 
It also appears that the oligopolistic behavior of chaebols adds a significant motive for firm diversification. Significant 
numbers of respondents indicate that chaebols diversify to compete with other chaebols.  Furthermore, large firms’ 
decision to maximize are interdependent, as each firm speculates on the reactions of other firms in the industry (Caves, 
1972; Hymer 1970, 1976). 
 
Diversification for the purpose of an inheritance to children is not as strong as the other three factors discussed above; 
nevertheless it must not be totally ignored. The survey results indicate that the family ties are strong in Korean chaebols 
and inheritance considerations are likely to be more important for the owners of chaebols.  When high inheritance 
taxes cause entrepreneurs to engage in non productive unlawful activities in corporate succession, chaebols will be 
less productive, leading to slower economic growth. 
 
Because chaebols are well-established business groups, they enjoy better recognized brand names than newly starting 
firms. Brand names are intangible resources and can be utilized without being depleted as they were used in new 
businesses (Caves, 1980; Schmalensee, 1982). Schmalensee (1982) points out that late entrants are disadvantaged 
relative to pioneering brands for experience goods. Therefore, diversification is easier for chaebols than non-chaebol 
firms. Scale and scope economies are advantages of chaebols. Knowledge and experience in different products are 
advantageous in adapting changing environments. 
 
However, chaebols also create difficulties.  Shortcomings of chaebols are primarily in management costs. Coase 
(1937) classified the firm’s costs into management cost, factor costs and transaction costs, arguing that management 
and transaction costs are likely to increase as a firm produces more internally rather than buying from markets. Sako 
(1992) indicated that interscale wage differentials between large and small firms in Japan caused increased 
subcontracting (outsourcing) during the ‘60s in Japan. Increasing wages compared to productivity (Park, 2000) in high 
income countries is reason that multinational firms move their production to lower income countries. Korean Chaebols 
experience high management costs and wages which make them less competitive in global markets. 
 
The lack of transparency of chaebols leads to problems of cross-subsidy, transfer pricing and self-dealing. These 
problems increase exit costs and inefficiency of chaebols. The owner and manger’s ‘imperialistic management’ in 
Korean chaebols have generated mixed experiences. Hanra, Haetae, Jinro and Ssangyong diversified to areas in which 
they did not have competencies and collapsed in the 1997 economic crisis. On the other hand, recent strong surges in 
telecommunication and electronics have contributed to the owner and manager’s commitment to financial support for 
research and development. 
 
Issues facing Korean chaebols confirm the problems of management and need to be addressed for chaebols to be more 
competitive. The chaebol form of business organization has advantages and shortcomings as discussed above. A test 
of chaebols became real in the 1997 economic crisis. Several chaebols were dissolved and changed ownership. For 
example, Daewoo groups, one of the big four chaebols before the crisis, became several independent single firms. 
Four units of the former Daewoo chaebols now belong to the top 50 businesses in Korea.  This is evidence that the 
1997 economic crisis and learning forced Korean chaebols to adapt to rapidly changing global markets.  As a result 
they gained global competitiveness. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
Traditional firm diversification theories study why, where and what of diversification. We have focused our study on 
why Korean chaebols are diversifying, issues facing chaebols, and chaebols` reforms after the 1997 economics crisis. 
 
Researchers on firm diversification advocate that firms’ sources of diversification are transaction cost, excess 
resources and scope economies. This study attempted to investigate other sources of chaebols` diversification in Korea. 
According to our Korean business firm survey Korean chaebols are diversifying to avoid risks stemming from a single 
product business, to participate in new business using newly emerging state of art technologies, and to compete with 
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other chaebols. These three factors have not been well studied in firm diversification research, but scholars in firm 
diversification need to pay attention to these factors. 
 
Korean chaebols enjoy brand name recognition for their diversification, scale and scope economies, and accumulated 
knowledge and experiences in many business fields. However, Korean chaebols suffer from lack of business 
transparency, the CEO’s autocratic decision making and increasing exit cost by cross-subsidy among firms within a 
chaebol. The primary issue facing Korean chaebols can be characterized as a management problem stemming from 
the complex nature of chaebols. Managerial and entrepreneurial roles have become crucial inputs in modern business 
corporation success as well as a nation’s economic growth. Therefore, Korean chaebols’ successful management is 
essential for the successes of chaebols as well as for Korean economic growth. 
  
We conclude that it is worthwhile for policy makers and scholars to pay attention to Korean chaebols’ diversification 
and their dynamic capabilities. Korean chaebols also need to foster the advantages of chaebols and address 
shortcomings, particularly the problems in management, to continue to gain and to sustain competitive advantages in 
the global economy.  Chaebols’ competitive advantages will then enhance the firm, increase performance employment 
and expand economic growth. 
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